Deceptive Decision-Making under Uncertainty
Yagiz Savas, Christos K. Verginis, Ufuk Topcu
[AAAI-22] Main Track
Abstract:
We study the design of autonomous agents that are capable of deceiving outside observers about their intentions while carrying out tasks in stochastic, complex environments. By modeling the agent's behavior as a Markov decision process, we consider a setting where the agent aims to reach one of multiple potential goals while deceiving outside observers about its true goal. We propose a novel approach to model observer predictions based on the principle of maximum entropy and to efficiently generate deceptive strategies via linear programming. The proposed approach enables the agent to exhibit a variety of tunable deceptive behaviors while ensuring the satisfaction of probabilistic constraints on the behavior. We evaluate the performance of the proposed approach via comparative user studies and present a case study on the streets of Manhattan, New York, using real travel time distributions.
Introduction Video
Sessions where this paper appears
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Poster Session 4
Fri, February 25 5:00 PM - 6:45 PM (+00:00)
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Poster Session 7
Sat, February 26 4:45 PM - 6:30 PM (+00:00)
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Oral Session 7
Sat, February 26 6:30 PM - 7:45 PM (+00:00)
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